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I.

INTRODUCTION

Minnesota’s implied consent law was enacted to prevent the
1
obvious dangers that intoxicated drivers present to the public.
However, the implied consent law is based on the underlying
assumption that drivers are free to choose whether to drive
2
intoxicated; but what happens when it turns out that this
assumption is flawed because the driver was forced to choose
between driving while intoxicated to escape a brutal attacker or
3
staying and risking physical harm? The Minnesota Supreme Court

1. See generally OFFICE OF TRAFFIC SAFETY, MINN. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY,
MINNESOTA IMPAIRED DRIVING FACTS 2013 (2014), available at https://dps.mn
.gov/divisions/ots/reports-statistics/Documents/minnesota-impaired-driving-facts
-2013.pdf (“387 people died in traffic crashes and 81 (21%) were in crashes
involving impaired (alcohol concentration of .08% or greater) drivers. . . . 2,300
people suffered injuries in alcohol-related crashes. . . . 25,719 motorists were
arrested for DWI . . . . One out of every seven licensed Minnesota drivers has at
least one DWI.”).
2. See infra Part II.
3. See Brief of Minnesota Society for Criminal Justice and Minnesota Ass’n
of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae at 4–5, Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub.
Safety, 848 N.W.2d 206 (Minn. 2014) (No. A12-1341), 2013 WL 8633181, at *4–5

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss5/1

2

Sharma: Protecting Victims of Domestic Abuse from an Overly Rigid Interpr

1624

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:5

recently held in Axelberg v. Commissioner of Public Safety that the
Minnesota Commissioner of Public Safety has the authority to
revoke the driver’s license of an intoxicated person who is fleeing
4
from domestic abuse in a motor vehicle. The court decided that
not only does the Commissioner have the right to revoke the
driver’s license, but the driver cannot even present evidence as to
why he or she drove while intoxicated or raise the affirmative
5
defense of necessity during the implied consent hearing. The
court reasoned that because the implied consent law does not
6
explicitly permit the driver to raise the defense, under the plain
meaning of the statute, the court cannot hear the defense, no
7
matter how severe the situation.
This Note begins by exploring the history and elements of the
8
implied consent law in Minnesota. Then, this Note discusses the
9
10
facts of Axelberg as well as the court’s analysis and decision. This
Note argues that the court incorrectly concluded that the
affirmative defense of necessity cannot be raised to challenge
11
driver’s license revocation in implied consent hearings. Finally,
this Note concludes by discussing how the court should have
decided Axelberg, how the legislature can remedy the problem, and
the public policy reasons that support amending the implied
12
consent law.
II. HISTORY AND CONTENT OF THE IMPLIED CONSENT LAW
The first implied consent law in Minnesota was enacted in
1961 as a way to incentivize any person exercising control over a
motor vehicle to agree to chemical testing to determine the

(“No sane individual would ask that an abused woman utterly submit to domestic
abuse and take her beating until the abuser decided he was finished. Likewise,
fighting back is an absurd option; escalating a fight against a dominant abuser
vastly increases the odds of someone—abuser or abused—ending up dead.”); see
also Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d 206.
4. Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d 206.
5. See id. at 207–08.
6. See MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3 (2014).
7. See Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 208–09.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.A.
10. See infra Part III.B–C.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See infra Part V.
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13

amount of alcohol in his or her system. The Minnesota implied
consent law has undergone many changes since it was enacted, but
the basic premise remains: refusal to submit to a chemical test or
testing above the legal limit for alcohol concentration results in
14
license revocation. In 1971, it became “a per se violation” for an
adult with a blood alcohol content of 0.10% or more “to drive,
15
operate, or be in physical control” of a vehicle. Further,
Minnesota’s implied consent law is imposed alongside criminal
16
penalties for “driving while impaired” (DWI). Even though these
systems are significantly entwined, the Minnesota Supreme Court
has determined that because the penalties associated with the
implied consent law are not punitive, the implied consent law is
17
civil in nature.
The primary purpose of the implied consent law is to promote
18
public safety on roadways by deterring driving while intoxicated.

13. See 9A HENRY W. MCCARR & JACK S. NORDBY, MINNESOTA PRACTICE:
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 56:2 (4th ed. 2014).
14. See id. Testing became mandatory in 1984 “and the administrative penalty
for refusing testing was increased.” Id.
15. Id. (“This created the symbiotic relationship between the DWI statute
and the Implied Consent statute.”).
16. See MINN. STAT. § 169A.01 (2014).
17. See State v. Hanson, 543 N.W.2d 84, 85 (Minn. 1996) (“Because civil
license revocation pursuant to the implied consent statute can fairly be
characterized as remedial, we hold that Minnesota’s statutory scheme of civil
license revocation followed by criminal prosecution is constitutional under double
jeopardy principles.”); see also MARGY WALLER & MARK ALLEN HUGHES, WORKING FAR
FROM HOME: TRANSPORTATION AND WELFARE REFORM IN THE TEN BIG STATES
1 (1999), available at http://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2014
/06/1999.08.01-Waller-and-Alan-Hughes_Working-Far-From-Home_Transportation
-and-Welfare-Reform-in-the-Ten-Big-States.pdf (“In most cases, the shortest
distance between a poor person and a job is along a line driven in a car. Prosperity
in America has always been strongly related to mobility and poor people work hard
for access to opportunities.”). See generally Nick Pinto, Do DWI Laws Work?,
CITYPAGES (June 11, 2010), http://www.citypages.com/2010-06-09/news/do-dwi
-laws-work/ (“But what some people find even more troubling is that the two-track
system of parallel criminal and civil penalties appears to be stacked against the
poor and indigent. It’s hard to find a lawyer in Minnesota who’ll represent a DWI
case for less than $500. Those who can’t afford a lawyer for their criminal case get
assigned a public defender . . . . Since the implied consent hearing is civil, if you
can’t afford a lawyer, you’ll be going head-to-head with the state with no one to
represent you.”).
18. State, Dep’t of Highways v. Halvorson, 288 Minn. 424, 425, 181 N.W.2d
473, 474 (1970).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss5/1

4

Sharma: Protecting Victims of Domestic Abuse from an Overly Rigid Interpr

1626

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:5

The implied consent law: (a) requires the driver take a test to
determine if he or she is under the influence of alcohol or a
19
controlled substance; (b) imposes penalties for refusal to take a
20
chemical test; (c) permits the arresting officer to compel testing if
the officer “has probable cause to believe the person has violated
21
the criminal vehicular homicide and injury laws”; and (d) affords
the driver “the right to consult with an attorney,” so long as
consultation does not “unreasonably delay administration of the
22
test.”
The implied consent law applies to all people who “drive,
23
operate, or [exercise] physical control of any motor vehicle.”
“Physical control” includes much more conduct than simply driving
24
under the influence, and the question of what constitutes
25
“physical control” continues to be an issue for courts. Minnesota
courts have found that operability of the vehicle is not necessary to
26
find physical control. In particular, courts have interpreted
27
“physical control” to include sleeping in your car, wandering
28
29
around your vehicle, switching places with the driver, or sitting
30
inside an immobile vehicle. However, it seems that there are limits
19. MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subdiv. 2(a)(1).
20. Id. § 169A.51, subdiv. 2(a)(2).
21. Id. § 169A.51, subdiv. 2(a)(3).
22. Id. § 169A.51, subdiv. 2(a)(4).
23. Id. § 169A.20, subdiv. 1; see also id. § 169A.51, subdiv. 1(a).
24. See State v. Fleck, 777 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Minn. 2010) (“The term ‘physical
control’ is more comprehensive than either the term to ‘drive’ or to ‘operate.’”
(citing State v. Harris, 295 Minn. 38, 43, 202 N.W.2d 878, 881 (1972))).
25. See id. at 237 (finding that a person sleeping in the driver’s seat is in
physical control of the motor vehicle); see also State v. Starfield, 481 N.W.2d 834,
839 (Minn. 1992) (holding that intent to drive is not an element needed to
establish physical control).
26. Starfield, 481 N.W.2d at 838–39 (finding that the driver was in physical
control of the vehicle even though the vehicle was stuck in a snow-filled ditch
because she was in close proximity of the operating controls of the vehicle).
27. Ledin v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 393 N.W.2d 433, 434 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986) (holding that revocation was proper when an intoxicated person was
discovered sleeping in a car parked on the street).
28. State v. Woodward, 408 N.W.2d 927, 928 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (finding
that the driver was in physical control of the vehicle when she was discovered
standing at the rear of her car).
29. State v. Prior, 356 N.W.2d 754, 755 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that
the driver was in physical control of the vehicle after he switched places with the
other person in the car after they stopped in a parking lot).
30. See Starfield, 481 N.W.2d at 838 (stuck in snow-filled ditch); Abeln v.
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when determining what constitutes physical control over a vehicle.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals determined that a person
sleeping in the front seat of the vehicle in the driveway was not in
physical control when the car occupant had left his house to avoid
31
a domestic quarrel. Yet, this decision was limited to criminal DWI
32
cases.
Under the implied consent law, a test to determine alcohol
concentration may be required when an officer has probable cause
33
to believe that the person was driving under the influence. When
determining whether the person has been driving under the
influence, the officer must establish a temporal connection
34
between the act of driving and the person’s intoxication. The
officer often does this by asking how long ago the vehicle was
driven or by asking the driver if he or she has consumed any
35
alcohol before or while driving.
A.

Challenging the Revocation: Administrative and Judicial Hearings

The process of revocation begins when the commissioner
receives a certification from a police officer stating that the driver
either refused the chemical test or submitted to a chemical test for
the presence of alcohol and the test results indicated an alcohol
36
concentration of 0.08% or higher. Revocation becomes effective
at the time the police officer or Commissioner of Public Safety
provides notice to the driver and an order of the intent to revoke

Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 413 N.W.2d 546, 547 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (dead
battery); Woodward, 408 N.W.2d at 927 (flat tire).
31. See State v. Pazderski, 352 N.W.2d 85, 86 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
32. Id. at 87; see, e.g., State v. Hage, 595 N.W.2d 200, 207 (Minn. 1999)
(holding that the driver was able to raise the defense of necessity against a
criminal charge of DWI).
33. MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subdiv. 1(b) (2014). Additionally, one of the four
factors listed in subdivision 1(b) has to be present in addition to probable cause
for the alcohol test to be required. Id.
34. See Eggersgluss v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 393 N.W.2d 183, 185 (Minn.
1986); Bohlig v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 379 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986).
35. See Lovato v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, No. A09-0143, 2009 WL 2928646, at
*3 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2009) (holding that there was a temporal connection
between the drinking and driving where the vehicle was parked and the driver
admitted that she had been drinking).
36. MINN. STAT. § 169A.52, subdivs. 1, 4.
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37

the driver’s license is received. The driver is issued a seven-day
temporary license if he or she had valid driving privileges at the
38
time of revocation.
39
There is a two-prong system for challenging the revocation.
The driver may seek administrative and judicial review of the
license revocation for test failure or refusal under the implied
40
consent law. The administrative and judicial review proceedings
41
are separate and not outcome-determinative. The administrative
review can be requested in writing any time during the revocation
42
period. The decision of the administrative review hearing is final
43
and is not subject to judicial review. The administrative reviewer
may consider evidence regarding why the license was revoked but
also “any other material information” to determine whether
44
“sufficient cause exists” for revocation.
The petition for judicial review must be filed in the county
where the alleged offense occurred within thirty days after the
45
notice and order of revocation. The petition must state “with
specificity” the reasons why the driver is seeking rescission of the
46
revocation. The purpose is to inform both the Commissioner and
the court of what is at issue so that time and money are not wasted
47
48
on undisputed matters. If the driver challenges the revocation,

37. Id. § 169A.52, subdiv. 6. But see H.R. 1305, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn.
2009). This bill would have delayed license revocation and other administrative
penalties for drivers suspected of driving under the influence until a conviction or
guilty plea. See id. It was most likely opposed because politicians suspected it would
weaken DWI deterrence by allowing continued driving after arrest.
38. MINN. STAT. § 169A.52, subdiv. 7(c).
39. Id. § 169A.53, subdivs. 12.
40. Id.
41. See Rancour v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 355 N.W.2d 462, 464 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984) (“[T]he administrative review . . . and the judicial review . . . are
separate and unrelated proceedings.”).
42. MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdiv. 1. The Commissioner will review the evidence and reports, render an administrative decision, and provide notice of that
decision within fifteen days. Id.
43. See Kleven v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 399 N.W.2d 153, 155 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987) (holding that administrative review proceedings of license revocation
under the implied consent law are not reviewable).
44. MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdiv. 1.
45. Id. § 169A.53, subdiv. 2.
46. Id. § 169A.53, subdiv. 2(b)(3).
47. Palbicki v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 347 N.W.2d 512, 515 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984).
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the district court is then required to hold an implied consent
49
hearing.
Judicial reviews and implied consent hearings are conducted
50
according to the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. Discovery is
mandatory but limited to the following information: notice of
revocation, the chemical test record, the peace officer’s certificate,
51
and disclosure of potential witnesses.
Additionally, the
constitutional protections of presumption of innocence and the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt are not applied to
the implied consent hearings because the court has held that such
52
hearings are civil in nature. Finally, the burden of proof is on the
Commissioner to make a prima facie case by a preponderance of
53
the evidence.
Under Minnesota Statute section 169A.53, the scope of the
issues for the implied consent hearing are framed as questions to
54
determine whether (1) there was probable cause for the arrest;
55
(2) the person was lawfully arrested; (3) the person was involved
56
in a traffic accident; (4) the person refused to take the
57
preliminary screening test; (5) the screening test indicated an
58
alcohol concentration of 0.08% or more; (6) the implied consent
59
advisory warning was administered properly; (7) the person

48. See Kristi Nielsen, Implied Consent, in MINNESOTA DWI DESKBOOK § 2.1 (3d
ed. 2013) (“Approximately fifteen percent of drivers whose driver’s licenses are
revoked under the implied consent law challenge their revocations.”).
49. MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdivs. 2–3; see also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,
539 (1971) (“Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner’s case, their continued
possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of
issued licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the
licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that
procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
50. MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdiv. 2.
51. Id.
52. State, Dep’t of Highways v. Halvorson, 288 Minn. 424, 431, 181 N.W.2d
473, 477 (1970).
53. King v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 366 N.W.2d 613, 615 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985) (citing Halvorson, 288 Minn. at 424, 181 N.W.2d at 473).
54. MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(b)(1).
55. Id. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(b)(2).
56. Id. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(b)(3).
57. Id. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(b)(4).
58. Id. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(b)(5).
59. Id. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(b)(6).
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60

refused the test; (8) the test indicated the presence of an alcohol
concentration of 0.08% or more of any controlled substance in
61
Schedule I or II, other than marijuana; (9) the test showed an
alcohol concentration of 0.04% or more when driving a
62
commercial vehicle; and (10) the testing method was valid and
63
reliable. The evidence that can be considered at the judicial
hearing is more constrained than the evidence that may be
64
considered during the administrative hearing.
It is notable that Minnesota courts have recognized additional
issues that can be broadly interpreted as part of the scope at
65
implied consent hearings. Courts have permitted evidence to be
introduced regarding whether a driver was actually driving,
66
operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle. Courts have
heard whether a license can be revoked when the driver became
intoxicated after driving and getting into a vehicle collision but
67
before taking a chemical test. And lastly, courts have heard
whether a driver was so incapacitated that he or she was incapable
68
of test refusal.
B.

Challenges to Minnesota’s Implied Consent Law

The history of the implied consent law in Minnesota has been
riddled with challenges such as harsher administrative sanctions,
criminal penalties, more relaxed constitutional safeguards, and the

60. Id. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(b)(7).
61. Id. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(b)(8).
62. Id. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(b)(9).
63. Id. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(b)(10).
64. Id. § 169A.53, subdivs. 1–2; see also Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety,
848 N.W.2d 206, 215 (Minn. 2014) (Lillehaug, J., dissenting) (“It is troubling that,
under the majority’s reading, the statute gives an administrative reviewer authority
to do justice, while the judiciary cannot.”).
65. See 31 DOUGLAS HAZELTON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: MINNESOTA DWI
HANDBOOK § 2:31 (20142015 ed.).
66. See Roberts v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 371 N.W.2d 605, 606 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985) (finding that a sleeping, intoxicated person in the front seat is not in
physical control of the vehicle when the driver had no knowledge that he was
placed in his car and his car was inoperable).
67. See Dutcher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 406 N.W.2d 333, 336 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987) (reasoning that post-accident consumption of alcohol is an affirmative
defense that can be used during an implied consent hearing).
68. See Thornton v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 384 N.W.2d 606, 608 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986) (holding that a driver was capable of making a reasoned test refusal).
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69

quest for more DWI arrests. The following issues highlight the
confusion created by Minnesota’s statutory system of parallel
criminal and civil penalties for test refusal and testing above the
legal limit. Moreover, the challenges to the implied consent law
illustrate the changing and elusive nature of this area of law.
1.

Right to Due Process Not Violated by Lack of Hearing Prior to
License Revocation

Revocation a driver’s license is a procedure that is subject to
70
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However,
the due process requirements applicable to driver’s license
71
revocations are “flexible.” In Dixon v. Love, the United States
Supreme Court weighed the state’s interest in road safety against
the need for a full evidentiary hearing prior to an administrative
72
revocation of the license. The Court determined that procedural
due process does not require a full evidentiary hearing prior to
revocation of a license where the opportunity for a hearing is
73
provided later. The Minnesota Supreme Court decided similarly
on several occasions that a pre-hearing license revocation does not
74
violate procedural due process.
2.

Arguing that the Statute Is Coercive

Minnesota courts have rejected the idea that the implied
consent law is coercive because it impermissibly extracts consent by
69. See infra Part II.B.12; see also 1 PATRICK T. BARONE & JOHN A. TARANTINO,
DEFENDING DRINKING DRIVERS § 100 (2d ed. 30th rev. 1986) (“Grass roots lobbying
efforts have resulted in stiffer penalties, relaxed constitutional safeguards and
attitude reformation in the legislatures and the judiciary.”).
70. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 543 (1971).
71. Goldsworthy v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 268 N.W.2d 46, 48 (Minn.
1978).
72. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 114 (1977) (“Far more substantial than the
administrative burden, however, is the important public interest in safety on the
roads and highways, and in the prompt removal of a safety hazard.”).
73. Id. at 115.
74. See Davis v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 517 N.W.2d 901, 904–05 (Minn. 1994)
(holding that the length of revocation prior to the hearing is reasonable, the
hardship relief is generally available after the waiting period, administrative review
is available, and that there is an interest in protecting the safety of the public),
superseded by statute, MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subdiv. 2 (2004), as recognized in State v.
Melde, 725 N.W.2d 99, 106 (Minn. 2006); see also State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety v.
Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d 316, 318 (Minn. 1981).
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75

threatening criminal penalties for test refusal. After the implied
consent statute was amended to make test refusal a crime, the
Minnesota Supreme Court determined that the possibility of
criminal charges do not compel drivers to refuse the test but,
76
rather, encourages them to submit to the test. Recently in State v.
Brooks, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that because the
77
driver was read the implied consent advisory, the officer made it
78
clear that the driver had a choice of whether to submit to testing.
3.

Right to Counsel at the Testing Stage of the Implied Consent
Process

In Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that the Minnesota Constitution gives a driver
a limited right to consult with an attorney before deciding whether
79
to submit to chemical testing for blood alcohol concentration.
This holding highlights the confusion between the civil and
criminal aspects of the implied consent process, because typically
the right to consult an attorney is permitted only for criminal
80
offenses.
C.

The History of the Defense of Necessity

“The defense of necessity is a narrow one, but it is deeply
rooted in our legal system” and is a valid common-law defense in
81
both criminal cases and civil tort actions. Necessity is commonly
known as the “choice of evils” defense, where conduct that is
otherwise banned is justified in order to prevent something worse
82
from happening. Necessity can be used as a defense only if:
75. See State v. Mellett, 642 N.W.2d 779, 783–85 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012).
76. See McDonnell v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 848, 855–56 (Minn.
1991) (holding that the refusal statute is not impermissibly coercive).
77. MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subdiv. 2 (2014).
78. 838 N.W.2d 563, 569 (Minn. 2013).
79. 473 N.W.2d 828, 837 (Minn. 1991).
80. Id.; see also Maietta v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 663 N.W.2d 595, 600 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2003) (finding that a driver cannot claim ineffective assistance of counsel
because implied consent hearings are civil in nature); 9A MCCARR & NORDBY, supra
note 13, § 56:70.
81. Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 848 N.W.2d 206, 214 (Minn. 2014)
(Lillehaug, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Johnson, 289 Minn. 196, 200–02, 183
N.W.2d 541, 544–45 (1971)).
82. 9 MCCARR & NORDBY, supra note 13, § 47:21.
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“(1) there is no legal alternative to breaking the law, (2) the harm
to be prevented is imminent, and (3) there is a direct, causal
83
connection between breaking the law and preventing harm.” The
defense can be used “only in emergency situations where the peril
is instant, overwhelming, and leaves no alternative but the conduct
84
in question.” The defense cannot be used when the emergency
could have been avoided by taking precautions or if the person
placed themselves in the position simply because it was more
85
convenient. Minnesota recognizes necessity as a defense against
the criminal charge of DWI when the driver is forced by specific
86
circumstances to drive while intoxicated.
III. THE AXELBERG DECISION
A.

Material Facts of Axelberg

On Memorial Day weekend in 2011, Jennifer Marie Axelberg
(Ms. Axelberg) and her husband Jason Axelberg (Mr. Axelberg)
traveled to Mr. Axelberg’s parents’ remote lake cabin in Kanabec
87
County, Minnesota. On Monday, they walked to Fish Lake Resort
88
to have drinks at the resort’s tavern. At some point, the Axelbergs
89
began arguing. According to Mr. Axelberg, Ms. Axelberg did not
90
provoke the argument. The couple walked back to the cabin later
83. State v. Rein, 477 N.W.2d 716, 717 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (citing United
States v. Seward, 687 F.2d 1270, 1270 (10th Cir. 1982)). In addition to the three
elements listed, necessity also requires that “the harm that would have resulted
from compliance with the law would have significantly exceeded the harm actually
resulting from the defendant’s breach of the law.” Id. (quoting Seward, 687 F.2d at
1275).
84. State v. Johnson, 289 Minn. 196, 199, 183 N.W.2d 541, 543 (1971).
85. Id.
86. See State v. Hage, 595 N.W.2d 200, 202, 207 (Minn. 1999).
87. Appellant’s Brief, Addendum & Appendix at 3, Axelberg v. Comm’r of
Pub. Safety, 831 N.W.2d 682 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013) (No. A12-1341), 2012 WL
8453648, at *3.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. This fact is important for the defense of necessity but also
demonstrates the ingrained belief that victims of domestic violence are to blame if
they could have provoked the attack with words. Laurie Kratky Dore, Downward
Adjustment and the Slippery Slope: The Use of Duress in Defense of Battered Offenders, 56
OHIO ST. L.J. 665, 687 n.95 (1995) (“As recognized by one court: ‘Some popular
misconceptions about battered women include the beliefs that they are
masochistic and actually enjoy their beatings, that they purposely provoke their
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in the night without conflict, but their argument started again after
91
they arrived at the cabin. The Axelbergs were intoxicated from
92
the drinks consumed at Fish Lake Resort. Ms. Axelberg was
leaning against their car, which was parked in the driveway outside
93
the cabin, while the argument continued. Mr. Axelberg stood
94
between the cabin and the car. The argument became physical
when “Mr. Axelberg pushed [Ms. Axelberg] in the chest and hit
95
her in the head twice.”
Ms. Axelberg’s options were limited because Mr. Axelberg was
96
blocking her path to retreat into the cabin. She did not want to
leave the property by foot because the road was unfamiliar and
unlit; she also thought that her husband would catch up to her if
97
she ran down the road. Ms. Axelberg did not seek help from the
neighbors because there were few other cabins in the area and she
98
was not familiar with any of the inhabitants. Lastly, Ms. Axelberg
was unable to call the police because Mr. Axelberg had taken her
99
cell phone, and there was no landline in the cabin.
After considering all these options, Ms. Axelberg decided to
100
seek refuge in the car. She locked all the doors to stop any
101
further attacks from Mr. Axelberg. Ms. Axelberg “testified [that]
she intended to use the car only as a barrier to her husband and
102
not to drive away from the scene.” However, Mr. Axelberg
jumped on the hood of the car and punched the windshield so
103
hard “that he spidered the glass.” Ms. Axelberg testified that she
feared he would break the windshield and would be able to reach
husbands into violent behavior, and, most critically, that women who remain in
battering relationships are free to leave their abusers at any time.’” (quoting State
v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 370 (N.J. 1984))).
91. Appellant’s Brief, Addendum & Appendix, supra note 87, at 3.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 4.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 4–5.
101. Id.
102. Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, No. 33-CV-11-292, 2012 WL 8527893,
at *2 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 3, 2012), aff’d, 831 N.W.2d 682 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013),
aff’d, 848 N.W.2d 206 (Minn. 2014).
103. Id.
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her, so she started the car and backed out of the driveway. Mr.
Axelberg jumped off the car but continued to shout and run after
105
Ms. Axelberg. Ms. Axelberg remembered the route to Fish Lake
Resort and decided to drive nine-tenths of a mile back to the
106
resort. Mr. Axelberg started walking to the resort in pursuit of
107
Ms. Axelberg. Ms. Axelberg arrived at the resort, parked, and
108
remained in the car because she was “not sure what to do.” Mr.
Axelberg arrived at the resort soon after Ms. Axelberg and
109
continued to act aggressively. A third party observed the fight and
110
called the police.
Kanabec County Deputy Justin Frisch arrived at the resort
111
around 2:28 a.m. He observed the vehicle, Ms. Axelberg, Mr.
112
Axelberg, and the third party in the parking lot. Deputy Frisch
spoke with the Axelbergs and learned that there was an argument
113
and that Ms. Axelberg had fled to the resort in the car.
Subsequently, Mr. Axelberg was charged with domestic assault and
114
disorderly conduct, and Ms. Axelberg was arrested for driving
115
while under the influence of alcohol. Ms. “Axelberg was asked to
116
take a chemical test for the presence of alcohol.” She agreed to
take the urine test, which showed an alcohol concentration of
117
0.16.

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. “Deputy Frisch does not recall whether [Ms. Axelberg] was in the
vehicle at this time.” Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. Mr. Axelberg pleaded guilty to both counts of domestic assault and
disorderly conduct. Id. at *2 n.1.
115. Id. at *2.
116. Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 848 N.W.2d 206, 207 (Minn. 2014).
117. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 169A.52, subdiv. 2(1) (2012)) (outlining
elements of the crime with which Ms. Axelberg was charged).
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Procedural Posture

The Commissioner of Public Safety revoked Ms. Axelberg’s
118
driver’s license pursuant to Minnesota Statute section 169A.52,
119
subdivision 4.
Ms. “Axelberg sought judicial review of her
120
At the implied consent hearing, Ms.
[license] revocation.”
Axelberg argued that her license should not be revoked “because
121
she acted out of necessity to protect herself from her” husband.
The district court sustained the revocation of her driving privileges;
the court held that necessity is not an affirmative defense that
122
drivers may raise at an implied consent hearing. Ms. Axelberg
appealed the decision and the court of appeals affirmed the district
123
court’s decision. The Minnesota Supreme Court granted her
124
petition for certiorari.
C.

The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision

After granting review, the Minnesota Supreme Court framed
the issue as whether the necessity defense was included in the issues
that may be raised at the implied consent hearing pursuant to
125
Minnesota Statute section 169A.53, subdivision 3. The Court
determined that this was a matter of statutory interpretation that it
126
would review de novo. The court decided that the defense of
necessity was not explicitly included in the list of issues that may be
118. Appellant’s Brief, Addendum & Appendix, supra note 87, at 1. Ms.
Axelberg “received a notice of revocation of her driver’s license” on July 25, 2011,
which was therefore effective on August 4, 2011. Id.
119. Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 207; see MINN. STAT. § 169A.52, subdiv. 4 (2014).
120. Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 207; see also MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdiv. 2.
Ms. Axelberg filed her Implied Consent Petition on August 10, 2011. Appellant’s
Brief, Addendum & Appendix, supra note 87, at 1.
121. Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 207.
122. Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, No. 33-CV-11-292, 2012 WL 8527893,
at *3–6 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 3, 2012) (citing Weierke v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety,
578 N.W.2d 815, 816 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998)) (“[I]t has not been explicitly
determined that the defense is available in implied-consent cases.”), aff’d, 831
N.W.2d 682 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013), aff’d, 848 N.W.2d 206.
123. Axelberg, 831 N.W.2d at 687. “A divided court of appeals affirmed” the
district court’s holding that “necessity is not an affirmative defense that drivers
may raise to challenge a civil license revocation.” Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 207.
124. Appellant’s Brief & Appendix at 1, Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d 206 (No. A121341), 2013 WL 8633179, at *1. Certiorari was granted on August 20, 2013. Id.
125. Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 206.
126. Id. at 208.
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raised during implied consent hearing under Minnesota Statute
127
section 169A.53 and that the legislature intended to “limit” the
implied consent hearings to only those issues in Minnesota Statute
128
section 169A.53. The court then used the dictionary definition of
129
“limited” to show the “common and approved usage” of the word
130
dictates that the issues are restricted to those on the list.
The court concluded that the legislature’s intent was not
ambiguous, even if the statute provided “an affirmative defense for
the petitioner to prove that, at the time of the refusal, the
petitioner’s refusal to permit the test was based on reasonable
131
grounds.” Based on the canon of construction, expressio unius,
132
codified in Minnesota Statute section 645.19,
the court
determined that because the legislature included one affirmative
defense, they did so with the intent to exclude all other possible
133
defenses.
Further, the court concluded that the affirmative
defense of necessity was not listed in the ten issues that drivers may
raise at the hearing, whereas the reasonableness of the refusal was
134
within the scope of the permissible issues. The court reasoned
that the rules of statutory interpretation did not allow for reading
135
other affirmative defenses into the statute. The court expressed a
fear that if it held an affirmative defense of necessity was available
under the statute, it would “allow for innumerable other affirmative
136
defenses to be offered at implied consent hearings.”

127. Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(b) (2014) (“The scope of the
hearing is limited to the issues in clauses (1) to (10).”).
128. Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 208–09.
129. Id. at 208 (“The word ‘limited’ means ‘[c]onfined or restricted within
certain limits.’” (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1019 (5th ed.
2011))).
130. Id. at 209.
131. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(c) (2012)).
132. MINN. STAT. § 645.19 (2014) (codifying expressio unius); BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 710 (9th ed. 2009) (defining expressio unius est exclusio alterius as “[a]
canon of construction holding that to express or include one thing implies the
exclusion of the other, or of the alternative”).
133. See Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 210.
134. Id. at 209 (“[W]hether the refusal was ‘reasonable’ is within the scope of
the issue listed in clause (7): whether the person refused to permit the test.”); see
also MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(b)(7).
135. Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 210 (“‘[T]he legislature intends the entire statute
to be effective and certain.’” (quoting MINN. STAT. § 645.17(2) (2012))).
136. Id.
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The court maintained that the common law defense of
137
necessity did not apply to the implied consent law. The court
argued that the legislature intended to preclude drivers from
raising the common law defense of necessity by explicitly omitting
138
it from the statute. Additionally, the court stated that the implied
consent law was a “complete system of law” that supersedes the
139
application of prior statutory and common law.
The court disagreed with Ms. Axelberg’s argument that
because the implied consent law has been described as “quasi140
criminal,”
common law defenses available in criminal cases
141
should also apply to implied consent cases. The court decided
that “the criminal proceedings for DWI serve to punish the
142
driver,” whereas the civil proceedings “protect public safety on
143
the highway.” Thus, in holding that the common law defenses are
not applicable, the court effectively rebutted the presumption that
144
implied consent proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature.
Lastly, the court stated that the concerns regarding forcing
victims of domestic abuse to choose between license revocation and
145
personal safety should be directed to the legislature. The court
acknowledged the competing policy considerations of preventing
146
domestic abuse and protecting the public from impaired drivers.
The court reasoned that the question before the court was the
statutory interpretation of the implied consent law, so the only
policy concern that should be addressed is the risk to public safety
147
from impaired drivers.
137. Id.
138. Id. (“We have long presumed that statutes are consistent with the
common law, and if a statute abrogates the common law, the abrogation must be
by express wording or necessary implication.” (quoting Brekke v. THM
Biomedical, Inc., 683 N.W.2d 771, 776 (Minn. 2004))).
139. Id. at 211.
140. See Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn.
1991); Prideaux v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 310 Minn. 405, 411, 247 N.W.2d
385, 389 (1976), abrogated on other grounds by Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 832.
141. Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 211.
142. Id. at 212 (citing MINN. STAT. §§ 169A.20.285 (2014)).
143. Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 212 (quoting Goldsworthy v. State, Dep’t of Pub.
Safety, 268 N.W.2d 46, 49 (Minn. 1978)).
144. Id.
145. Id. (“[W]e must read this state’s laws as they are, not as some argue they
should be.”).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 212–13 (refusing to prioritize a policy of protecting victims of
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The court released its four to three decision concluding that
the affirmative defense of necessity cannot be raised during an
148
implied consent hearing based on the reasons listed above. The
decision included three strongly worded dissents from Justices
149
Lillehaug, Wright, and Page.
IV. ANALYSIS OF AXELBERG
A.

Ms. Axelberg Acted out of Necessity

First, Ms. Axelberg’s experiences the night of the incident
certainly suggest that she acted out of necessity and should be
entitled to relief. After Mr. Axelberg shoved and hit Ms. Axelberg
in the head twice, she sought refuge in her vehicle by locking all
150
the doors. Mr. Axelberg continued to threaten her by jumping
151
on the car and pounding on the windshield until it shattered.
152
These facts show that Ms. Axelberg faced risk of imminent harm.
Ms. Axelberg was unable to out-run Mr. Axelberg; nor could she
seek refuge with neighbors because she was unfamiliar with the
153
area. Ms. Axelberg had no logical alternative other than to start
the vehicle and drive a short distance to the nearest public
location. The conduct of driving was the direct result of Ms.
Axelberg’s attempt to avoid imminent harm; she was escaping a
154
violent attacker. Her conduct was the lesser of two evils when she
155
acted to avoid death or serious injury. Thus, she acted out of
necessity.

domestic abuse over the focus of the legislation).
148. Id. at 213.
149. See id. at 21317 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting); id. at 21720 (Wright, J.,
dissenting); id. at 22024 (Page, J., dissenting).
150. Appellant’s Brief & Appendix, supra note 124, at 5–6.
151. Id. at 6.
152. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 750 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “imminent” as
“[s]omething which is threatening to happen at once,” “something to happen
upon the instant.”).
153. See Appellant’s Brief & Appendix, supra note 124, at 5.
154. Id. at 6.
155. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980) (“[T]he defense of
necessity, or choice of evils, traditionally covered the situation where physical
forces beyond the actor’s control rendered illegal conduct the lesser of two
evils.”).
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Minnesota Courts Previously Had Not Foreclosed the Possibility that a
Necessity Defense May Be Raised When Appropriate

The Minnesota Court of Appeals has heard several implied
consent cases that raised the defense of necessity. In Frohn v.
Commissioner of Public Safety, the court determined that the defense
156
was “unavailable” to the specific driver due to his conduct. The
issue was framed as whether the defense was available to the driver,
not whether the defense could be raised under the implied consent
statute, permitting the inference that the defense could be
157
available when the elements are met. If the defense was not
available, it is unclear why the court analyzed whether the elements
158
of necessity were met in the case.
Next, in Weierke v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the court of
appeals determined that the record did not demonstrate that the
driver had no other options than to drive while intoxicated, and
159
accordingly, the necessity defense could not be raised. However,
in Weierke, the court asserted that “it has not been determined that
160
the necessity defense [was] available in implied consent cases.”
Nevertheless, Weierke still did not foreclose the possibility that the
defense could be asserted.
In Solorz v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the court reasoned that
as an “error-correcting court,” it could not create a defense within
156. No. C1-94-1250, 1995 WL 34821, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 1995)
(holding that the defense of necessity cannot be asserted with the following facts:
appellant-driver was drinking at a bar when he had an altercation with bar
management and a patron; he was chased to his vehicle and the pursuer pounded
on his window; he then drove away to escape before the window broke).
157. Id. at *2 (“We conclude that appellant has not met the elements
necessary to establish the necessity defense in this case. Although appellant’s
conduct may appear reasonable, he had alternatives other than driving his car for
six or eight miles while intoxicated. Additionally, appellant’s own disruptive and
belligerent conduct necessitated his removal from the bar . . . appellant must
nevertheless take responsibility for putting himself in a dangerous position.”
(emphasis added)).
158. Id. at *1 n.1 (“Traditionally . . . proceedings have been considered
essentially civil in nature. This view began to change in Prideaux v. State, when the
supreme court questioned the validity of the ‘civil’ label of the license revocation
proceedings. The criminal nature of implied consent proceedings was reinforced
in Friedman v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety. Thus, an argument can be made that the
necessity defense should be available in implied consent proceedings.” (citations
omitted)).
159. 578 N.W.2d 815, 816 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
160. Id.
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161

the implied consent law. In its opinion, the court noted that “the
task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court or the
162
legislature.”
The Frohn, Weierke, and Solorz cases support the argument that
the Axelberg court had the discretion to hold that the defense of
necessity applied, or at the very least, that application of the
defense was a possibility.
C.

The Court’s Absurd Interpretation of Legislative Intent

The majority’s interpretation of Minnesota Statute section
163
169A.53, which precludes the defense of necessity, creates an
164
unreasonable result. Minnesota Statute section 645.17 dictates
that “the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd,
165
impossible of execution, or unreasonable.” The court has an
obligation to go beyond the plain language of the statute if a literal
166
interpretation “leads to absurd results or unreasonable results.”
Furthermore, the consequences of a particular statutory
167
interpretation are relevant for determining legislative intent.
Here, revoking the license of someone who was fleeing from
imminent harm was an unreasonable result that could have been
avoided if the court had held that the affirmative defense of
necessity is relevant to implied consent proceedings.
1.

The Court’s Narrow Interpretation of the Scope of Judicial Review
Yields an Unreasonable Result

The scope of the implied consent hearing is guided by
168
Minnesota Statute section 169A.53. The statute provides that the
hearing is limited to the issues listed in clauses (1) to (10), which
169
are phrased in the form of questions. As Justice Lillehaug pointed
161. No. A12-0006, 2012 WL 3023425, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. July 23, 2012)
(citing Tereault v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)).
162. Id.
163. See Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 848 N.W.2d 206, 208–09 (Minn.
2014).
164. See Brief of Minnesota Society for Criminal Justice and Minnesota Ass’n
of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae, supra note 3, at *15.
165. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 645.17(1) (2012)).
166. Wegener v. Comm’r of Revenue, 505 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn. 1993).
167. See MINN. STAT. § 645.16(6) (2014).
168. Id. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(b); see also supra Part II.A.
169. MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(b).
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out in his dissent, the scope does not simply provide that the
170
Arguably, the
hearing is restricted to answering questions.
171
emphasis of the scope is on the issues that are enumerated. It
follows then that the issues within the scope of the hearing are:
“probable cause; driving, operation, and physical control of the
172
vehicle; the arrest; test taking or refusal; and test results.” Here,
the facts surrounding Ms. Axelberg’s choice to drive while
intoxicated are within the scope of the enumerated issues as such a
discussion would have addressed the issues of driving, operating,
and being in physical control of the vehicle, in addition to her
defense for that conduct. The purpose of providing a scope of
issues for the hearing is to create an efficient and timely process;
however, too narrow an interpretation of the hearing’s scope
creates an absurd result, and the scope should be permitted to
include more than simply a yes or no answer to the listed questions.
2.

That the Defense of Necessity May Be Available for Test Refusal
but Not for Driving While Impaired Is an Absurd Result

The court’s holding in Axelberg created a disconnect between
the defenses available for test refusal and those available during
implied consent hearings. Affirmative defenses are allowed by
statute to determine whether a driver had reasonable grounds for
173
refusing to take a chemical test. Examples of reasonable grounds
for test refusal include: where an officer’s request for the driver to
174
take a test is confusing and misleading, where failure to provide
175
samples resulted from a physical inability, and where the driver
170. Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 848 N.W.2d 206, 214 (Minn. 2014)
(Lillehaug, J., dissenting).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(c) (“It is an affirmative defense for the
petitioner to prove that, at the time of the refusal, the petitioner’s refusal to
permit the test was based upon reasonable grounds.”).
174. See State, Dep’t of Highways v. Beckley, 291 Minn. 483, 485–87, 192
N.W.2d 441, 444–45 (1971) (finding that the driver had reasonable grounds to
refuse the test because the officer failed to clarify the rights and obligations under
the implied consent statute). But see Johnson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 375
N.W.2d 99, 102–03 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that test refusal was not
reasonable where a driver was too intoxicated to understand his rights and
obligations).
175. See Aunan v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 361 N.W.2d 907, 909 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985) (holding that the trial court must determine if the “failure to provide

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015

21

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 5 [2015], Art. 1

2015]

AXELBERG V. COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY

1643

176

intends to plead guilty to the criminal charge of DWI. Under this
“reasonable grounds” standard, it is possible that necessity could be
a viable affirmative defense for test refusal.
This, too, creates an unreasonable result because it entices
drivers who can claim a defense of necessity to refuse the test. “The
obvious and intended effect of the implied-consent law is to
coerce the driver suspected of driving under the influence
177
into ‘consenting’ to chemical testing . . . .” Allowing affirmative
defenses only for test refusal would frustrate the purpose of the
178
implied consent law, which is to encourage consent to the test.
Hence, it creates an absurd result to allow affirmative defenses only
for test refusal and not for testing above the alcohol concentration
limit.
D.

Courts Have Considered Issues Beyond the Ten Enumerated Questions
in the Past

The following cases illustrate how, historically, Minnesota
courts have broadly interpreted the scope of implied consent
hearings, permitting the consideration of issues other than those
enumerated in Minnesota statute 169A.53. These cases support the
argument that the supreme court should have considered the
affirmative defense of necessity in Axelberg.
1.

Dutcher v. Commissioner of Public Safety

The affirmative defense of post-accident alcohol consumption
is not one of the issues expressly permitted to be heard during the
implied consent hearing; however, the defense was recognized in
179
Dutcher v. Commissioner of Public Safety. The court of appeals
reasoned that it was simply good policy because it did not want to
punish someone who was not drinking at the time the car accident
180
occurred. Similarly, in Axelberg, it is not good public policy to

two breath samples resulted from . . . physical inability”).
176. See State, Dep’t of Highways v. Schlief, 289 Minn. 461, 463, 185 N.W.2d
274, 276 (1971).
177. Prideaux v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 310 Minn. 405, 409, 247 N.W.2d
385, 388 (1976), abrogated on other grounds by Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety,
473 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn. 1991).
178. See id.
179. 406 N.W.2d 333, 336 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
180. Id.
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deny the affirmative defense of necessity simply because it is not
enumerated in the statute.
2.

Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety

The “civil” label of license revocation under the implied
consent law is not enough to extinguish certain constitutional
safeguards, such as consulting with an attorney prior to taking a
181
chemical test for alcohol concentration. Therefore, constitutional
issues are recognized as defenses even though they are not listed in
the ten enumerated issues in Minnesota Statute section 169A.53. In
Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the supreme court relied on
article I, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution to determine that
a driver has a constitutional right to consult with counsel because
182
the testing decision is a “critical stage” in a DWI proceeding.
E.

The Court Does Not Always Strictly Adhere to the Limits Imposed by
Statutory Text

The Minnesota Supreme Court recently decided in State v. Ali
that mandatory life without the possibility of release (LWOR)
sentences for juveniles are unconstitutional when the sentences are
imposed without a judge or jury having the opportunity to consider
183
mitigating circumstances. The court reversed the imposition of a
mandatory sentence of LWOR even though the sentence is
184
expressly permitted by the legislature in the statutory text. The
majority determined that its decision will “effectuat[e] the
legislative policy” even if that policy is not yet written in the
185
statute.
The court tried to distinguish Axelberg from Ali on the basis
that in Ali “the Legislature has not yet expressed its policy
preference,” whereas in Axelberg, the public policy is clear, and “it is
the prerogative of the Legislature, not the judiciary, to determine

181. Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 834.
182. Id. at 837.
183. 855 N.W.2d 235, 256–57 (Minn. 2014).
184. Id. at 253 (discussing Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)) (finding
that mandatory LWOR sentences are unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama,
even though Minnesota statutes currently allow for mandatory LWOR sentences
and the legislature has not changed the statutes).
185. Id. at 256 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Chauvin, 723 N.W.2d
20, 27 (Minn. 2006)).
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what constitutes sound public policy and to make the statutory
186
revisions necessary to reflect that policy determination.”
However, in Ali, the legislature arguably clearly expressed its policy
preference for mandatory LWOR sentences in the statutory
187
language. Additionally, the legislature had been alerted to the
LWOR problem by Miller v. Alabama and had not yet changed the
statute in response. Conversely, in Axelberg, the legislature did not
explicitly prohibit using the defense of necessity to escape domestic
188
violence; the policy preference is far from clear. The defense of
necessity is a common-law defense that has not been addressed by
the Minnesota legislature but continues to be used as an affirmative
defense in the courts. The court’s argument in Axelberg that it
189
would be “pure judicial will” if the court effectuated the necessity
defense was, in reality, the court’s exercise of judicial restraint with
respect to an unpopular issue.
The court improperly differentiated between Ali and Axelberg.
At issue in Axelberg were two policy concerns: safety on the roads
190
and advocating for victims of domestic violence. The legislature
has expressed its interest in protecting victims of domestic violence;
however, the court failed to give sufficient weight to that policy
191
concern, employing its rhetoric of strict statutory adherence.
Notwithstanding the conflicting policies, Axelberg was more a
question of the application of a defense “deeply rooted in our
192
jurisprudence.” It is unlikely that the legislature intended to
prevent people facing assault, murder, or rape from hiding in their
cars, or, in the most desperate situations, driving away from their
186. Id. at 266 (Page, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
187. Id. at 256 (majority opinion).
188. Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 848 N.W.2d 206, 217 (Minn. 2014)
(Lillehaug, J., dissenting) (“Moreover, the necessity defense is not a mere policy
preference; it is a legal concept deeply rooted in our jurisprudence.”). “If there is
any ‘pure judicial will’ being exercised in [Axelberg], it might be the majority’s
interpretation of this statute without regard to its ‘application to an existing
situation.’” Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2012)).
189. Id. at 212 (majority opinion).
190. Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 212 (“This case therefore could be cast in terms
of competing policy considerations, with policies aimed at protecting victims of
domestic abuse competing with policies aimed at protecting victims of impaired
drivers.”)
191. Id. (“This public policy concern [personal safety of victims of domestic
abuse] should be directed to the Legislature because we must read this state’s laws
as they are, not as some argue they should be.”).
192. Id. at 217 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting).
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attacker. The court in Axelberg could have read the statute more
broadly to include a defense of necessity, but it chose not to. The
court in Ali determined that “remanding . . . will not infringe on
the Legislature’s unique power to define the punishment for
193
crimes.” Similarly, if the court in Axelberg found that the defense
of necessity was available, it would not have infringed upon the
legislature’s power to define crimes or encourage test consent. Nor
would it “impair the commissioner’s ability to process implied
consent cases because the necessity defense is so rare and so
194
difficult to prevail on.”
F.

Refuting the Majority’s Espressio Unius Interpretation

It is unreasonable to interpret the absence of an explicit
reference to “necessity” as a bar to the defense being used in
implied consent hearings. The majority in Axelberg asserts that since
the statute mentions an affirmative defense of proving that the test
refusal was based on reasonable grounds, all other affirmative
195
defenses are prohibited. Justice Lillehaug raised the argument
that the legislature chose to use the definite article “an” instead of
196
the limiting definite article “the.”
He argued that if the
legislature intended to limit the affirmative defenses to only this
one, it could have easily done so by the use of: “the only affirmative
defense,” “the one affirmative defense,” or simply “the affirmative
197
defense.”
Moreover, it is unlikely that the legislature intended that the
affirmative defense be available for proof of reasonable test refusal
198
but not for test failure. It is also unlikely that the legislature
intended for the affirmative defense to be available during
199
administrative but not judicial review. This interpretation creates
inconsistencies within the statutory framework. As Justice Wright
pointed out, the legislature’s purpose in enacting this statute was to
193. State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 256 (Minn. 2014).
194. Appellant’s Brief & Appendix, supra note 124, at 16.
195. See Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 209.
196. Id. at 215.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 218 (Wright, J., dissenting).
199. Compare MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdiv. 1 (2014) (explaining
the applicability of the affirmative defense for administrative review), with id.
§ 169A.53, subdiv. 2 (explaining the applicability of the affirmative defense for
judicial review).
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200

criminalize test refusal. But the majority’s decision promotes
refusal of the chemical test for drivers in similar circumstances to
201
Axelberg in order to invoke the necessity defense.
G.

Quasi-Criminal Nature of the Implied Consent Law

Courts have distinguished prosecutions for DWI and implied
consent proceedings on the basis that one is criminal and one is
202
civil. Procedurally, implied consent hearings may be civil, but the
hearings are held at the same time and stem from the same facts
203
and conduct as the criminal hearings for DWI. Minnesota courts
have recognized the affirmative defense of necessity in the criminal
204
charge of DWI. Additionally, “the emergency operation of any
vehicle when avoiding imminent danger” creates an exception for
205
the crime of reckless driving. So, why would this exception not
extend to implied consent proceedings?
The court has recognized that driver’s license revocations are
“necessarily and inextricably intertwined with an undeniably
206
criminal proceeding.” In Friedman, the court said that the implied
consent hearings are “quasi-criminal” and, on that basis, provided a
limited right to counsel that has typically been reserved for
207
criminal defendants. However, although the court has recognized
the quasi-criminal nature of the implied consent proceeding, it

200. Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 218.
201. Id.
202. Prideaux v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 310 Minn. 405, 410, 247 N.W.2d
385, 389 (1976) (“Only after the driver makes his decision regarding the test does
the proceeding divide clearly into its civil and criminal aspects . . . .”), abrogated on
other grounds by Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn.
1991).
203. Id. at 410, 247 N.W.2d at 38889 (“The license revocation proceeding
thus becomes an arm of the prosecutor in his attempt to gather evidence against
the accused for use in criminal prosecution. Moreover, it is used as a means of
obtaining evidence [a]t the time of arrest or detention for suspicion [o]f driving
under the influence.” (alterations in original)). Although Prideaux was overruled,
the language regarding the hybrid nature of implied consent hearings remains
valid.
204. State v. Hage, 595 N.W.2d 200, 201, 207 (Minn. 1999) (holding that a
necessity instruction is appropriate in a criminal case where the defendant
asserted that she hid in a car from her abusive boyfriend).
205. MINN. STAT. § 169.13, subdiv. 3(b)(2) (2014).
206. Prideaux, 310 Minn. at 409, 247 N.W.2d at 388.
207. See Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 832, 835.
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refused to also recognize the traditional protections provided in
208
criminal matters, such as allowing common-law defenses. Even if
the application of the necessity defense has only been applied in
criminal and civil tort cases, the legislature allowed room for the
court to recognize the defense of necessity in implied consent
209
hearings when appropriate.
210
Although implied consent hearings are “civil” in nature, the
penalties imposed are arguably just as harsh as the criminal DWI
211
sanctions. The revocation of a driver’s license may have the effect
of taking away a person’s ability to earn a living, which can be just
212
as devastating as fines or imprisonment. The result of losing a
208. See Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 184, 186–87 (Minn.
1994) (holding that evidence of alcohol-impaired driving obtained from an
unconstitutional sobriety-check roadblock could not be used at an implied
consent proceeding).
209. See Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 848 N.W.2d 206, 215 (Minn.
2014) (Lillehaug, J., dissenting).
210. See id. at 214 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 169A.53, subdiv. 3(a) (2012)).
211. See Prideaux, 310 Minn. at 410, 247 N.W.2d at 389 (arguing that the loss
of a driver’s license can be devastating); see also MINN. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY,
DRIVER’S LICENSE DWI ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS INITIATIVE: SUMMARY REPORT
3 (2011), available at https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/ots/educational-materials
/Documents/DWI-Adminstative-Sanctions-Report.pdf.
The removal of a license after a DWI could hamper one’s ability to get
to work, treatment, [Alcoholics Anonymous] groups, therapy and
court appearances—the very things associated with compliance,
responsibility and sobriety . . . . Based on the number of “Driving after
Withdrawal” violations issued, many people continue to drive illegally
after their license had been revoked or cancelled. Often these
individuals are also driving without insurance. Illegal driving is not just
a Minnesota problem. Nationally it is estimated that at least 70 percent
of people continue driving even after their license has been revoked or
cancelled.
Id.
212. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 30 (1979) (“Even a day’s loss of a
driver’s license can inflict grave injury upon a person who depends upon an
automobile for continued employment in his job.”); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,
539 (1971) (“Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner’s case, their continued
possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of
issued licenses thus involved state action that adjudicates important interests of the
licensees.”); see also Lee A. Bjorndal, Mower County License Return Program: Breaking
the Cycle of Revocations, BENCH & B. MINN., Feb. 2001, at 26 (“A driver’s license is an
absolute necessity for most Minnesotans. We need our driver’s license to get to
work, to transport children, and to travel. In many communities, there is no public
transportation. Businesses are often near the outskirts of town and not within
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213

driver’s license may lead to additional offenses: driving after
214
215
driving after revocation,
and driving after
suspension,
216
cancellation. Furthermore, the Commissioner of Public Safety
can use prior convictions as reasons to lengthen license
217
revocation. Finally, criminal DWI penalties can be enhanced by
218
prior license revocations.
Criminal proceedings and implied
consent proceedings are undeniably intertwined, and those who
want to establish an affirmative defense for either proceeding
should be afforded the opportunity.
V. WHAT CAN BE DONE GOING FORWARD TO REMEDY
THIS PROBLEM?
A.

How the Court Should Have Decided Axelberg

The Minnesota Supreme Court should have held that the
necessity defense may be raised in implied consent hearings. First,
the court should have concluded that the interpretation of the
issues enumerated in the implied consent statute extend more
219
broadly to include affirmative defenses related to the proceeding.
This would be consistent with the legislature’s express intent to
walking distance.”); Means of Transportation to Work by Selected Characteristics 2011
–2013 American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://fact
finder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_13
_3YR_S0802&prodType=table (last visited Apr. 27, 2015) (showing that
approximately eighty-two percent of employees in Minnesota drive alone or
carpool to work).
213. Bjorndal, supra note 212 (“[P]eople are able to drive legally and not get
involved in a downward spiral of one driver’s license offense after another.”); U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, COMMUTING IN THE UNITED STATES: 2009, at 18 (2011), available
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acs-15.pdf (demonstrating that
“[c]ommuting in the United States is dominated by private automobile travel, as is
evidenced by the large proportion (86.1 percent) of workers 16 years and over
who commuted by car, truck, or van in 2009”).
214. MINN. STAT. § 171.24, subdiv. 1 (2014).
215. Id. § 171.24, subdiv. 2.
216. Id. § 171.24, subdiv. 3.
217. See id. § 169A.54, subdiv. 1.
218. Id. §§ 169A.03, subdiv. 21(a)(1), 169A.24, subdiv. 1(1); see also State v.
Omwega, 769 N.W.2d 291, 293–94 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that using
prior implied consent license revocations to enhance a misdemeanor DWI charge
is constitutional where a driver was provided notice of the revocation and the
process for challenging it).
219. See supra Part IV.CD.
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220

prevent unreasonable results. The court has shown that it has the
power to go beyond strict statutory interpretation when the
221
circumstances warrant doing so. Next, the court should have
examined the quasi-criminal nature of implied consent
proceedings to determine that the consequences of license
revocation are as severe as fines and imprisonment, especially when
taking independence away from a person facing domestic
222
violence. Lastly, the court should not have turned a blind eye to
223
its fundamental function of administering justice, particularly
given the extreme facts presented by the Axelberg case.
B.

How the Legislature Can Address the Problem

Since the Minnesota Supreme Court has foreclosed the
possibility of the use of the defense of necessity for test failure in
judicial implied consent hearings, a possible solution is to
encourage the legislature to amend the language of Minnesota
Statute section 169A.53. There is pending legislation that clarifies
the scope of the implied consent hearing and would allow for the
affirmative defense of necessity to be used in judicial implied
224
consent hearings. The proposed change to Minnesota Statute
section 169A.53 would delete language that only allows affirmative
defenses for reasonable test refusal during judicial hearings and
adds language permitting all the affirmative defenses allowed in
225
criminal DWI proceedings. These defenses include: when the
driver consumed alcohol after the violation but before the alcohol
concentration test; using prescription drugs according to the
prescription while operating a vehicle; reasonable test refusal; and
“[i]f proven by a preponderance of the evidence, . . . [when] the
226
defendant’s conduct was a result of necessity.” It also creates a
requirement that notice must be given to the Commissioner seven
227
days prior to the hearing if an affirmative defense will be raised.
The proposed legislation aligns the criminal prosecutions and
220. See supra Part IV.C.
221. See supra Part IV.D.
222. See supra Part IV.G.
223. See, e.g., In re Petition for Integration of the Bar of Minn., 216 Minn. 195,
199, 12 N.W.2d 515, 518 (1943).
224. S.F. 1073, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2015).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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implied consent hearings, addressing concerns that implied
consent hearings are “quasi-criminal” in nature and should be
treated as such.
C.

Allowing the Affirmative Defense of Necessity in Implied Consent Cases
Is Good Public Policy

At its core, the affirmative defense of necessity is based on
good public policy. “In essence it reflects a determination that if, in
defining the offense, the legislature had foreseen the
circumstances faced by the defendant, it would have created an
228
exception.” As Axelberg makes clear, the legislature did not weigh
the competing values of driving while intoxicated to escape a
violent attacker with keeping the roads clear of impaired drivers. If
it had, Minnesota Statute section 169A.53 would likely have
included such circumstances in its enumerated issues.
The court adopted a view that denies complete protection to
victims who seek refuge in their vehicles and to those escaping a
229
violent encounter. A domestic abuse victim’s loss of a driver’s
license “may deprive [him or her] of financial independence,
treatment and counseling services, transportation for [his or her]
children, and the only reliable means of escape in the next
230
emergency.”
Implied consent law should not be interpreted in a manner
that is contrary to the legislature’s efforts to protect victims of
231
domestic abuse
in response to the prevalence of domestic
232
violence in our society. Minnesota district courts handled 27,288
228. State v. Tate, 505 A.2d 941, 946 (N.J. 1986).
229. See Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 848 N.W.2d 206 (Minn. 2014).
230. Id. at 216 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting).
231. See MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subdivs. 123 (2014). The Domestic Abuse Act
became effective on May 25, 1979. Act of May 25, 1979, ch. 214, 1979 Minn. Laws
214, 414–17; see MINN. STAT. ch. 5B (allowing victims of violence to establish
designated addresses in all public matters to prevent harm from being located
through the “Safe at Home” program).
232. See MINN. COAL. FOR BATTERED WOMEN, 2013 ANNUAL FEMICIDE REPORT 7
(2013) (“At least 38 Minnesotans were killed due to violence from a current or
former intimate partner.”); see also Minnesota Injury Data Access System (MIDAS)—
Hospital Data, MINN. DEP’T HEALTH, http://www.health.state.mn.us/injury/midas
/ub92/index.cfm (last visited May 4, 2015) (select “Minnesota Regions” and “State
of Minnesota” as the Region/County; then “Battering/maltreatment” and “Rape”
as the Mechanism/Cause; and then “Compare Genders” as the Gender). In 2013,
1328 patients received treatment for injuries in hospitals in Minnesota related to
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233

domestic violence cases in 2011.
A 2010 National Intimate
Partner and Sexual Violence Survey by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that 684,000 Minnesota
women will be subjected to “[p]revalence of [r]ape, [p]hysical
[v]iolence, and/or [s]talking by an [i]ntimate [p]artner” during
234
their lifetime. The Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women
reports that at least twenty-five women died from domestic violence
235
This is consistent with national
in Minnesota during 2013.
pervasiveness of domestic violence; the CDC reported that
“[a]pproximately 1.3 million women and 835,000 men are
physically assaulted by an intimate partner annually in the
236
United States.” “The study makes it clear that violence against
women . . . should be classified as a major public health and
237
criminal justice concern in the United States.” The implied
consent law should not be interpreted in a manner that revictimizes people affected by domestic violence.
One concern is that permitting necessity as an affirmative
defense might allow for false claims of abuse when a driver is
accused of driving while intoxicated, which would impair the
238
Commissioner of Public Safety’s ability to quickly process cases.
239
However, necessity is rarely used and it is difficult to prove.
[O]nce in a great while a . . . case comes along that
presents facts so bizarre and remote from the public
battery and rape (958 battering/maltreatment and 370 rapes). Id. Eighty-two
percent of the battery/maltreatment patients were women. Id.
233. MINN. JUDICIAL BRANCH, REPORT TO THE COMMUNITY: THE 2011 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE MINNESOTA JUDICIAL BRANCH 1719 (2011), available at http://www
.mncourts.gov/Documents/0/Public/Court_Information_Office/AR_11_Final2.pdf
(including 2853 felony domestic assault cases; 2863 gross misdemeanor domestic
assault cases; 10,607 misdemeanor domestic assault cases; and 10,965 domestic
abuse filings).
234. The National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey (NISVS), CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention
/nisvs/state _tables_74.html (last updated Nov. 14, 2014).
235. MINN. COAL. FOR BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 232, at 7.
236. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT
OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN:
FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY, at iv (2000),
available at www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183781.pdf.
237. Id. at v.
238. Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 831 N.W.2d 682, 690 (Minn. Ct. App.
2013) (Chutich, J., dissent), aff’d, 848 N.W.2d 206 (Minn. 2014).
239. Id.
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policy underlying the law that even a Court as committed
as this one to the strict enforcement of the drunk-driving
statutes can pause to make certain that no injustice has
240
been done.
Axelberg is such a case.
VI. CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, impaired driving is a valid concern for our
society, but the interpretation of laws should not neglect the
importance of preventing unreasonable results by disallowing valid
affirmative defenses. The court held that the statute at issue in
Axelberg addresses only a policy aimed at protecting the public from
impaired drivers and therefore did not require an analysis into the
241
policy interest of protecting victims of domestic violence. The
inclusion of the affirmative defense of necessity is at the heart of a
policy that protects all citizens of Minnesota. The implied consent
law implies that the driver has a choice as to whether or not to get
into a vehicle or drive while intoxicated. In this case, there was no
reasonable choice or alternative in order to escape a violent attack.
To not apply the defense of necessity in these circumstances was to
allow an injustice.

240.
241.

State v. Fogarty, 607 A.2d 624, 632 (N.J. 1992) (Stein, J., dissenting).
Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 212–213.
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